ABSTRACT A new construction of a blind signature scheme based on braid groups is proposed. In the random oracle model, the proposed scheme is provably unforgeable against chosen message attacks, assuming that the one-more matching conjugate problem in braid groups is intractable. Furthermore, in the infinite group model, the scheme is proved to be perfectly blind. Our construction represents a technique to lift a braid group to its conjugate subgroups for particular applications. The proposed scheme is very fast in signing but relatively slow in verifying and is thus suitable for scenarios that require signing as soon as possible but permit a slight delay in verifying. In addition, our proposal is invulnerable to known quantum attacks and therefore would be a good alternative to RSA-based and DLP-based blind signatures in the post-quantum era.
I. INTRODUCTION A. BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND CONTRIBUTIONS
The concept of blind signatures was invented by Chaum [1] as a key ingredient for anonymous electronic cash applications. Blind signatures allow a signer to issue signatures without knowing the content of the signed documents while simultaneously preventing users from forging signatures [2] - [9] . In general, a blind signature σ on a given message m is produced in three steps: 1) Blinding: The user transforms m into m by employing a random and secret factor b, usually called a blind factor, and then sends m to the signer. 2) Signing: Upon receiving a signing request on m, the signer produces signature σ on m and then sends σ to the user. 3) Unblinding: Upon receiving σ , the user removes the blind factor b involved in σ and then obtains the signature σ on the message m. According to the scenario, a blind signature scheme allows users to output signatures that are not signed by the signer. Thus, we should assign new secure semantics to blind signatures. On one hand, a blind signature scheme is unforgeable if
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there is no adversary that can, with non-negligible probability, fulfill the so-called one-more forgery attack [2] , which states that an adversary, usually modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm, breaks the unforgeability of a blind signature scheme if he/she can output at least l + 1 valid signatures after requesting l signing queries to the signer. On the other hand, as a restriction towards the signer, the blindness property of a secure blind signature scheme requires that a malicious signer has no more advantage than guessing to determine the order in which the messages are signed by interaction with an honest user [1] , [3] , [9] . The blindness property is an abstraction of two basic requirements of papermade cash systems: unlinkability and untraceability.
Numerous blind signature schemes have been constructed based on the integer factoring problem (IFP), discrete logarithm problem (DLP), and other variant assumptions related to the IFP or DLP [4] - [7] , [10] , [11] . However, these schemes are vulnerable to the quantum algorithmic attacks invented by Shor [12] , Kitaev [13] , and Proos and Zalka [14] . Thus, a fundamental idea for securing electronic cash applications in the post-quantum era is to design new blind signature scheme based on new hard problems. In addition to the wellknown lattice problems, such as the shortest vector problem (SVP), the closest vector problem (CVP) [15] and the learn with error (LWE) problem [16] , [17] , the conjugacy problems from some non-commutative groups also have potential advantages in resisting quantum attacks [18] .
Our motivation is to design a quantum-secure blind signature scheme based on braid groups. Two key techniques were employed for ensuring the security of our design: a blinding technique embedded in the homomorphic property of the conjugate operation and a hash function that maps every message to the conjugate subgroup of the underlying group. These two techniques are not new: the former can be found in [19] and [20] , and the latter first appeared in [21] . Our contribution is, for the first time, to couple the techniques to ensure the blindness property.
In brief, our work includes three aspects. First, a new blind signature scheme based on braid groups is presented. Next, a technique to lift the braid group to its conjugate subgroups for particular purposes is proposed. Finally, comparisons and evaluations of parameter selection, performance, and security levels are provided.
B. RELATED WORK
In 2008, Verma [22] proposed two blind signatures using braid groups. Unfortunately, Verma's schemes are insecure: they are linkable since the signer can decide the order in which the blind signatures are produced by judging the conjugate relationships between the blinded and unblinded signatures. Similar attacks on Verma's schemes were reported by Kumar [23] . In our opinion, Verma's schemes are insecure because they fail to combine the aforementioned two techniques in [19] , [20] , and [21] . Beyond [21] , we provide a further investigation of the security of the involved hash function.
Other constructions of braid-based blind signatures have been reported. Yun et al. [24] proposed a strong blind signature scheme over braid groups. Their main contributions are based in two aspects: simultaneously working on four separate subgroups of B n and using additional randomness to avoid the weakness of simultaneous conjugating. Li et al. [25] proposed a proxy blind signature by laying the security on the hardness of the conjugacy problem, simultaneous conjugacy problem and root problem. Ren and Chang [26] further built a threshold proxy blind multisignature over braid groups. However, all these designs need to be completed by, for example, providing more rigorous security proofs and more elaborate performance evaluations.
C. ORGANIZATION
The remaining content is organized as follows. The necessary preliminaries on braid groups and related hard problems are presented in Section II. Our main contributions, including the design of the building blocks, the intended braid-based blind signature scheme and the involved hash function, are given in Sections III, IV and V, respectively. A performance evaluation is presented in Section VI. Finally, all proofs of the theorems are provided in Appendix.
II. PRELIMINARIES
For n ≥ 2, one can define the braid group B n = A|R 1 , R 2 by n − 1 Artin generators A = {a 1 , · · · , a n−1 } with two types of generating relations: R 1 = {a i a j = a j a i : |i − j| > 1} and R 2 = {a i a j a i = a j a i a j : |i − j| = 1}. For n ≥ 3, B n is not commutative, and its center is an infinite cyclic subgroup. Two braids x, y ∈ B n are said to be conjugate, written as x ∼ y, if y = zxz −1 holds for some braid z ∈ B n (here, z or z −1 is called a conjugator of x and y). Over the braid group B n , we can define the following cryptographic problems related to conjugacy [27] :
• Conjugacy Decision Problem (CDP): Decide whether x ∼ y holds for a given instance (x, y) ∈ B 2 n .
• Conjugator Search Problem (CSP): Find z ∈ B n such that y = zxz −1 holds for a given instance (x, y) ∈ B 2 n with x ∼ y.
• Generalized Conjugator Search Problem (GCSP): Find z ∈ B m (m < n) such that y = zxz −1 holds for a given instance (x, y) ∈ B 2 n with x ∼ y.
• Matching Conjugate Problem (MCP): Find y ∈ B n such that y ∼ y and xy ∼ x y for a given instance (x, x , y) ∈ B 3 n with x ∼ x . At present, we know that all the above problems are solvable; however, in general cases, we do not know whether they are tractable. In the worst case, all the problems appear to be intractable [27] , [28] . The assumption of intractability of the CSP is the common basis of most, if not all, existing braidbased cryptosystems. In their pioneering paper [27] , Ko et al. proposed a one-way function based on the assumption of the intractability of the GCSP. Moreover, they defined an algorithm, K gcsp , for sampling hard GCSP pairs. The MCP was first formulated and proved to be equivalent to the CSP in [29] . A probabilistic algorithm for solving the CDP with high accuracy and acceptable complexity was proposed [29] (See Section VI). This algorithm is crucial for braid-based signature schemes that need to determine whether two given braids are conjugate.
III. THE BUILDING BLOCK
Our building block, denoted by V-SCSS, is a variant of the simple conjugate signature scheme (SCSS) [29] . Suppose that integer n is the braid index and the security parameter. Let B n be the underlying group and M = {0, 1} * the message space. For a given braid p ∈ B n , H p : M → p B n is a cryptographic hash function that maps an arbitrary message to a braid conjugate to p. Here, p is the parameter braid that is fixed and made public in advance. Now, suppose (n, B n , M, H (·) ) is the system public parameters, where H (·) indicates H p when p is unspecified or indifferent. Then, V-SCSS consists of the following algorithms:
• G(1 n ), a probabilistic key generating algorithm that takes as input the security parameter n and then invokes K gcsp (n). Suppose (p, q, s)
Then, the signer takes s and the pair (p, q) as her (private) signing key and (public) verifying key, respectively. According to the definition of K gcsp (n), we know that
n and (p, q = sps −1 ) is a GCSPhard pair. Furthermore, H (·) is parameterized to H p when p is published.
• S(s, m), a deterministic signing algorithm that takes as inputs the signing key s and the message m ∈ M and outputs
as the signature on m.
• V(p, q; m, σ ), a deterministic verifying algorithm that takes as inputs the public key pair (p, q) and the message-signature pair (m, σ ) and outputs 1 if
hold simultaneously, or 0 otherwise.
A. CONSISTENCY AND SECURITY

Theorem 1 (Consistency of V-SCSS):
The proposed signature scheme V-SCSS is consistent, i.e., if the signer follows the signature generation protocol, the resulting signature satisfies the verification with probability 1.
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Theorem 2 (Unforgeability of V-SCSS): Suppose n is the security parameter and H
IV. THE MAIN CONSTRUCTION
A. SCHEME DESCRIPTION Suppose (n, B n , M, H (·) ) is the system public parameters as defined in the above section. Our braid-based blind signature scheme, denoted by B3S, consists of the following components:
• G(1 n ), a probabilistic key generating algorithm that is the same as G(1 n ) of V-SCSS.
• Blind signature issuing protocol: -blinding(p, m), a probabilistic algorithm executed by the user that takes as inputs the public key p and the original message m and performs the following steps: (i) Selects a braid b ∈ RB( n/2 + 1, n − 1) at random; (ii) Computes the blind message braid
where RB(j, k) (j < k) is the subgroup generated by Artin generators a j , a j+1 , · · · , a k ; (iii) Sends m to the signer. -signing(s, m), a deterministic algorithm executed by the signer that takes as inputs the signing key s and the blinded message m and replies to the user with the blinded signature
-unblinding( σ , b), a deterministic algorithm executed by the user that takes as inputs a blinded signature σ and the corresponding blind factor b and outputs
as the (unblinded) signature on the original message m.
• V(p, q; m, σ ), a deterministic verifying algorithm that is the same as V(p, q; m, σ ) of V-SCSS. 
B. CONSISTENCY AND SECURITY
V. DESIGN OF H p
Both V-SCSS and B3S use a special hash function H p that maps the message space M to p B n . In the above sections, H p is modeled as a random oracle for security reductions. For practical purposes, we need to discuss how to implement H p .
In 2000, Ko et al. [27] described an implementation of cryptographic hashes that map bit strings to braids. However, the images of these hashes are not necessarily conjugate to a common braid p that is fixed and made public in advance; therefore, we cannot use Ko et al.'s constructions directly. Instead, we must proceed further. Let B n be the underlying group and M = {0, 1} * the message space and suppose that we already have a hash function h : M → B n that maps an arbitrary message to a random braid [27] , [31] . Then, a practical instantiation of the parameterized hash function H p can be defined as follows:
That is, H p (m) is a braid that is conjugate to the braid p by taking h(m) as the conjugator. Note that from the perspective of implementation, both B n and p B n are replaced by some finite subsets of B n . Sibert et al. [21] used a similar method for hashing from braids to braids, but our main motivation for using this hash is to ensure blindness. Furthermore, we prove the following theorems on the security of this design. Proof: See Appendix F.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
The complexities of braid operations, including multiplication and canonical form transformation, are bounded by O(l 2 n log n) in the sense of bit operations [32] and [33] , where n and l are the braid index and canonical length of the involved braids, respectively. In addition, the verifying process of our schemes needs to solve the CDP. Ko et al. [29] invented a probabilistic algorithm that can solve the CDP with complexity O(rln 3 ), and the probability for making an erroneous decision, denoted by p err , is bounded by (
) r , where p and r should be sufficiently large such that p err is acceptable. Here, the complexity for deciding conjugacy is evaluated in the basic operation in finite field F p that takes O(log 2 p) bit operations in turn. Thus, the total complexity would be O(rln 3 log 2 p) in the sense of bit operations. Typically, if we set p to be a prime that closes to 2ln 2 and r = n, then p err is bounded by ( 1 2 ) 2n , and the total bit complexity for deciding conjugacy is O(ln 4 log 2 (ln 2 )), which is proportional to 2 38 when n = 50 and l = 100.
A braid in B n with l canonical factors can be represented by a bit string of size ln log n [27] , and for generic choices of b, x ∈ B n , the canonical length of bxb −1 can be assumed to be between 2l and 3l or, equivalently, 2(ln log n) ∼ 3(ln log n) bit size. Thus, when n = 50 and l = 100, the sizes of the private key and public key are approximately 16K and 128K bits, respectively (See Table 1 for details). Clearly, the keys are considerably large. At present, all braid-based cryptosystems suffer from this disadvantage.
The security levels of the proposal can be evaluated from two different aspects. First, according to [33] , the bit complexity of existing heuristic attacks (say towards the weak keys) can be evaluated by 50 150 ≈ exp(92.80). Furthermore, if the private keys are selected carefully, all known heuristic attacks on braid-based cryptographic schemes would be frustrated [34] . Then, according to [27] , the hardness for conducting a brute force attack is proportional to exp( 1 2 ln log n). Thus, when n = 50 and l = 100, the security level against brute force attack is proportional to exp(978). This result suggests that it is impossible to launch exhaustion attacks on our scheme in the foreseeable future.
In brief, we can summarize the performance comparison for two cases: Case I takes the currently acceptable parameter settings and Case II increases the security level of RSA-based systems to exp(92.80). The results are shown in Table 2 . In both cases, our scheme is very fast in signing and acceptably slow in verifying.
Remark 3: About 10 years ago, we [35] made the performance evaluation on braid-based signature schemes in similar angles. But in today's view, the results presented in [35] is too optimistic to be secure. The main difference is the setting on the parameter l, i.e. canonical length of working braids. In [35] , we set l = 10 by taking into consideration of Maffre's suggestion [33] and the feasibility of Ko's CDP algorithm [29] , while neglected the probability of keeping random working braids non-commutative. Now, with the purpose of ensuring the collision resistance property of braid-lifting hash function H p , we suggested to set l = 100 so that the probability of two random braids being commutative vanishes.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Blind signatures have been used in numerous applications, most prominently in anonymous voting systems and anonymous e-cash systems. However, the development of quantum computation creates distrust in most number-theory-based blind signature schemes. In this paper, we proposed a new blind signature scheme based on hard braid problems. The scheme has several merits: round optimal (in communications), perfectly blind (in the infinite group model), invulnerable to known quantum attacks, etc. Our scheme is very fast in signing and acceptably slow in verifying and is thus suitable for scenarios that require promptness of signature generation but tolerate a delay in verifications. An observable inferiority of our scheme is that the private/public keys are large.
APPENDIX PROOFS OF THE THEOREMS A. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof: The first conjugate relationship σ ∼ H p (m) is apparently implied by the formula (1). The second can also be immediately derived from
B. PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof: First, let us introduce an one-more version of the MCP, i.e., the one-more matching conjugate problem (OM-MCP), which was introduced in [19] based on the corresponding intractability assumption. Ko et al.'s simple conjugate signature scheme (SCSS) was first proved to be unforgeable against chosen message attacks (UF-CMA) in the random oracle model (ROM). The OM-MCP is defined via an experiment involving a GCSP-hard pair generator K gcsp and an OM-MCP attacker A are involved:
• K gcsp is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input the security parameter n and outputs a triple (p, q, w) ∈ B n × B n × B n/2 such that q = wpw −1 and (p, q) is a GCSP hard pair, i.e., finding a conjugator w ∈ B n/2 for the pair (p, q) is intractable.
• A is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that receives input p, q and has access to two oraclesthe matching conjugate oracle O mc (·) and the challenge oracle O ch () -and wants to win the experiment. 
i.e., the probability that the above experiment returns 1, taken over the coins of K gcsp , the coins of A, and the coins used by the challenge oracle across its invocations. The onemore matching conjugate assumption states that the onemore matching conjugate problem associated with K gcsp is intractable, i.e., Adv
om−mcp
K gcsp ,A (n) is negligible with respect to the security parameter n for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries A.
Wang et al. [19] presented a sufficient discussion of the OM-MCP assumption and the relationship between the OM-MCP and CSP (also GCSP). Note that in one-more type experiments, the adversaries are not permitted to choose challenges by themselves, but they can submit queries on their own choices. The adversaries win the experiments only if the number of submitted queries is strictly less than the number of correctly answered challenges [19] , [36] .
Next, let us sketch the proof of the theorem. Suppose H (·) is parameterized by p. That the forger F can (t, q h , q s , )-break V-SCSS means that F can output a forged signature (m * , σ * ) successfully with probability at least after he has made q h hash queries and q s signing queries and then obtained the corresponding signatures σ i for messages m i , i = 1, · · · , q s . A successful forgery σ * on message m * means that σ * ∼ H p (m * ) and qσ * ∼ pH p (m * ) hold while F has never made signature query on message m * .
The key idea of the proof is that we can construct another algorithm A that can win the one-more matching conjugate experiment with probability at least = by taking the forgery F as a subroutine.
Let A engage in an interactive process with adversary F and record all necessary information. Whenever F invokes a hash query, A calls the oracle O ch and forwards its response to F. Whenever F invokes a signature query on some message m, then A performs the following steps: VOLUME 7, 2019 • Finds 1 the response c for the corresponding hash query on m;
• Sends c to the oracle O mc ;
• Obtains the response braid b and forwards b to F as the request signature. Note that the probability that F forges a valid signature without invoking a hash query is negligible since the hash function is modeled as a random oracle. Then, whenever F finally outputs a forgery that can pass the validation, this forgery enables A to win the experiment E om−mcp K gcsp ,A (n).
C. PROOF ON THEOREM 3
Proof: According to the unblinding formula (5), the signing formula (4) and the blinding formula (3), the first conjugate relationship σ ∼ H p (m) holds apparently.
Note that RB( n/2 , n−1) is generated by Artin generators a n/2 , a n/2 +1 , · · · , a n−1 and B n/2 is generated by Artin generators a 1 , a 2 , · · · , a n/2 −1 . From the relations in the definition of braid groups, we know that for ∀s ∈ B n/2 and ∀b ∈ RB( n/2 , n − 1), sb = bs holds. Thus, the second conjugate relationship can also be immediately derived from
D. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
Proof: According to the semantics of the nonforgeability of blind signatures, we know that the one-more forger F can (t, q h , q s , )-break B3S means that within time t, F can output q s +1 valid signatures with probability at least after he has made q h hash queries and q s signing queries. Now, we can construct a forger F as follows: (1) Let F engage in an interactive process with F and the signer of V-SCSS, denoted by S V −SCSS , and record all necessary information. In fact, F will intercept all communications between F's and the signer of B3S, denoted by S B3S . F will attempt to simulate the behavior of S B3S for F, i.e., to provide responses to F's signing query on behalf of S B3S . Moreover, since H (·) is modeled as a random oracle, F can control H (·) and provide responses on hash queries H (·) for all participants. From the perspective of F, F 's responses to the hash and signing queries are perfect, and from the perspective of S V −SCSS , F 's responses to the hash queries are also perfect. Even if F and S V −SCSS are allowed to compare their hash values, they cannot distinguish the responses from the output of a real hash H p . Clearly, F must intercept all signing queries from F and prevent S V −SCSS from directly replying to F's signing queries. This agreement is rational because S V −SCSS is not the signer of the scheme that F implements. In brief, F directly forwards F's forgery as his own forgery since B3S and V-SCSS share the same verification algorithm and essentially similar signing protocols. F 's advantage is F's advantage. 
E. PROOF OF THEOREM 5
Proof: According to the definition of blindness, the attack objective of the adversarial signer A is to distinguish the order of the production of the signatures. For every message m, H p (m) ∈ p B n holds. Then, every signature σ conjugates to p and thus also conjugates to each other. Thus, A cannot break blindness by determining whether two braids are conjugate. Further, A cannot break the blindness by determining whether two braids are identical since A does not know the original messages he signed. A's signing was performed on the blinded messages; thus, A's has no means to extract the corresponding original messages.
Further, let us prove that in the infinite group model, even if A has the capability to solve the GCSP, he has no advantages to break the blindness of B3S. W.l.o.g., given two message-signature pairs (m 0 , σ 0 ) and (m 1 , σ 1 ), we will prove that A's success probability for determining which of them is produced earlier is no more than 1/2. Note that conjugators are always not unique for a given conjugate pair, and all valid signatures, all blind message braids, and all hash values of the original messages in our schemes are conjugate to each other. Therefore, we obtain a commutative diagram (8) 
Suppose that A has sufficient memory to record all blinded message braids m i (i = 1, 2, · · · ) according to the time sequence of receiving them, i.e., m 0 appeared before m 1 from A's perspective. For a successful, he needs to find a witness that supports the correlativity between H p (m 0 ) and m 0 and simultaneously denies the correlativity between H p (m 0 ) and m 1 ; or vice versa. However, no well-defined concept exists for this type of correlativity. Even if A has worked out a blind factor b 0 ∈ RB( n/2 + 1, n − 1) that conjugates H p (m 0 ) to m 0 , he cannot determine that σ 0 is produced earlier since RB( n/2 + 1, n − 1) is infinite and A has no reason to exclude the possibility of the existence of another blind factor b 1 ∈ RB( n/2 + 1, n − 1) that conjugates H p (m 0 ) to m 1 . All real used blind factors are selected by the users and kept unknown to A. Thus, A has no more advantage than guessing to decide whether m 0 or m 1 is the original message corresponding to blinded message braid m 0 or m 1 .
F. PROOF OF THEOREM 6
Proof: The proof consists of three steps.
• One-wayness of H p . If there is an adversary A that can derive m from H p (m) (i.e., h(m)ph(m) −1 ) with nonnegligible probability, then we can construct another adversary B that can also extract m from h(m) with nonnegligible probability, as follows:
(1) Upon receiving challenge h, B computes A's challenge H = hph −1 ; (2) B calls A to derive m with the input H ; (3) Upon receiving response m from A, B outputs m as the reply. Clearly, if A wins its challenge, so does B; thus, the onewayness of h implies the one-wayness of H p .
• Second pre-image resistance of H p . For a given m 1 hold, can he successfully break the second pre-image resistance of H p . In general, given x and p, it is difficult to find y( = x) such that xpx −1 = ypy −1 since extracting such y from the pair (x, xpx −1 ) is equivalent to solving a GCSP instance. Therefore, no polynomial adversary can break the second pre-image resistance of H p by taking Case (1) as the starting point. As for Case (2), a successful attack means the breaking of the second pre-image resistance of h, which is a contradiction.
• Collision resistance of H p . First, for randomly chosen braids x, y ∈ B n , let us calculate P x↔y , the probability that (xy)p = p(xy). Let us use P i↔j to denote the commutative probability of two random Artin generators a i and a j (i, j ∈ {1, · · · , n − 1}). Apparently, we have Then, we have x −1 yp = px −1 y. However, according to the above calculation, this occurs only with negligible probability, which suggests that H p is collision resistant.
